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Abstract
We study optimal monetary stabilization policy in a DSGE model with microfounded money
demand. A search externality creates ‘congestion’ which causes aggregate output to be inef-
ficient. Due to the informational frictions that give rise to money, households are unable to
perfectly insure themselves against aggregate shocks. This gives rise to a welfare improving
role for monetary policy that works by adjusting the nominal interest rate in response to these
shocks. Optimal policy is determined by choosing a set of state-contingent nominal interest
rates to maximize the expected lifetime utility of the agents subject to the constraints of being
an equilibrium.
Keywords: monetary policy, optimal stabilization policy, search equilibrium, microfounda-
tion of money
JEL: E43, E52
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1 Introduction
Since Keynes, monetary economists have been interested in studying stabilization policy in the
presence of market frictions. The typical friction imposed is nominal price and/or wage rigidity.
This assumption means that changes in the money supply are not neutral, consequently monetary
policy can aﬀect real allocations. In this class of models, the standard policy implication is to
conduct counter-cyclical monetary policy. The intuition for this is straightforward – if demand
for goods increases, then it is eﬃcient to let prices rise to some extent. But with sticky prices,
households consume more than the eﬃcient amount. Thus, the monetary authority should tighten
policy by raising the nominal interest rate to constrain consumption from rising to ineﬃciently high
levels.
An interesting question is whether this same policy advice holds when other frictions are the
reason for the non-neutrality of money. For example, in search based models of money or in cash-
in-advance models, households face liquidity constraints on purchases of goods. In these models,
should the monetary authority pursue a counter-cyclical monetary policy? Ireland (1996), for
example, shows that the Friedman rule is optimal and perfectly stabilizes demand shocks. But
what if the Friedman rule is not optimal due to some other friction in the economy? How do
optimal stabilization policies look like? These are the questions we address in this paper.
The basic framework is that of Lagos and Wright (2005) where informational frictions make
money essential as a medium of exchange.1 We modify the model in several ways. First, we
introduce a search externality by assuming that in every period producers make an entry decision.
Second, we carefully model the existence of a credit market that allows agents to borrow and lend
money. Third, we introduce a variety of well-defined aggregate shocks, such as productivity and
preference shocks, that generate consumption risk for households. Finally, we consider three pricing
1Most stabilization policy analysis has been done using the canonical New Keynesian model with sticky prices.
In this class of models, in the absence of nominal rigidities, monetary policy is ineﬀective since money is neutral. An
important contribution of our paper is to show that the informational frictions that give rise to a medium of exchange
role for money allow for a welfare improving role of stabilization policy even when all prices are fully flexible.
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protocols — competitive pricing, monopoly pricing and price posting — in the market where money
is essential as a medium of exchange.
Borrowing from Rocheteau and Wright (2005), we assume that upon entering the market, a
producer is able to trade with some probability, which may not be one. In short, he may be shut
out of the market despite having paid the entry cost. We then study optimal stabilization under two
assumptions regarding this trading probability. In one case, we assume that this trading probability
is independent of the number of producers in the market. In the second case, we assume that the
probability of trading is decreasing in the number of entering producers. This is intended to capture
the idea that as more producers enter congestion occurs making it harder to trade and earn profits.
Our basic results concerning the optimal stabilization policy are as follows. With a fixed prob-
ability of trading, the optimal monetary policy is to run the Friedman rule and set the nominal
interest rate to zero in all states. This is true for all three pricing protocols. When the trading
probability depends on aggregate entry, a congestion externality arises that makes entry ineﬃciently
high. Thus, the central bank finds it optimal to raise interest rates above zero in all states in order
to reduce profits and deter entry even though it lowers average consumption. Once again, this is
true for all pricing protocols. In short, the zero lower bound is never a binding constraint in our
model. The key to implementing the desired allocation is to manipulate the relative price of goods
across markets by choosing state-dependent nominal interest rates.
Our framework for studying optimal stabilization policy builds on Berentsen and Waller (2011).
In this earlier paper, we have shown that even when all prices in the economy are fully flexible,
monetary injections are non-neutral if the central bank has a price-level target. Furthermore,
we have demonstrated that away from the Friedman rule there is a welfare improving role for
stabilization policy. However, we have also found that the optimal policy is the Friedman rule
in which case the optimal stabilization policy requires the central bank to set a nominal interest
rate of zero in all states. The key innovation of our current paper is that we introduce the above
mentioned congestion eﬀect. With this externality, the optimal policy deviates from the Friedman
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rule and allows for a non-trivial optimal stabilization policy. Furthermore, we study how diﬀerent
pricing protocols aﬀect the optimal policy, while in our earlier paper we only consider competitive
pricing.
There are precedents for such macro externalities in the literature. For example, in endogenous
entry/search models where the terms of trade are determined by bargaining, there may be too many
buyers or sellers relative to the social optimum. In these models, deviating from the Friedman rule
may be optimal to improve the extensive margin. Such externalities are studied, for example, in Shi
(1997), Lagos and Rocheteau (2005), Rocheteau and Wright (2005), Berentsen, Rocheteau and Shi
(2007), and Aruoba, Rocheteau and Waller (2007), Aruoba and Chugh (2010), and Liu, Wang and
Wright (2011). While these papers investigate the implications of these externalities for the optimal
steady-state inflation rate, we investigate the implications for the optimal stabilization policy.2
Our framework for studying optimal stabilization policy is also related but substantially diﬀerent
from the literature on endogenous entry. Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) use a prototypical real
business cycle model, hence there is no role for monetary policy. The other papers in this area are
based on New Keynesian sticky price models. Furthermore, many of them look at the eﬀects of
monetary shocks — they do not study optimal monetary policy. Of those that study optimal policy,
Bergin and Corsetti (2008) and Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2007) do so for a simple class of interest
rate rules with a single productivity shock. They consider a model where entry enlarges the set
of goods available to households. The households have a love for variety, so that enlarging the set
of goods can have a positive externality on household utility. In contrast, in our model firm entry
imposes a negative congestion externality.3 As such, our model captures episodes where there was
2Rocheteau and Wright (2009) is a quantitative version of Rocheteau and Wright (2005), where the extensive
margin is modeled as an agent’s endogenous choice of whether being a buyer or a seller. They find that a small
deviation from the Friedman rule can improve welfare if there are too many buyers. When inflation increases, the
cost of holding money increases and agents prefer to become sellers. As long as this eﬀect is not outweighed by the
negative eﬀect on the intensive margin; i.e. quantity per trade, a deviation from the Friedman rule can increase the
number of sellers and, hence, the number of trades in equilibrium.
3 In our model, for all pricing protocols, the only externality is related to the entry congestion. There is neither a
consumer surplus eﬀect (through increased product diversity) nor a profit destruction eﬀect (through a reduction in
the price level) as in Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2008).
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“too much entry from a social point of view” as suggested by many observers of the recent events in
the housing and commercial property markets. Finally, Lewis (2009) is also related to our work in
that she derives the optimal monetary policy using a Ramsey Primal Approach in a cash-in-advance
model. She finds that the Friedman rule is optimal and that under nominal rigidities monetary
policy has a stabilization role through its control over the money stock. Finally, we address other
issues, such as the zero lower nominal bound on interest rates, that these papers do not.
Finally, we want to address one caveat. Our results rely on the assumption that fiscal policy is
absent or impotent as an instrument to control entry. Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2008) show in
monetary economies with sticky prices that the eﬃcient allocation can be implemented if fiscal and
monetary policies are chosen optimally. In our environment, if the government were to design the
tax system such that all entry externalities are internalized, the Friedman rule would implement
the first-best allocation. However, this would require that taxes are state-contingent which might
be diﬃcult to implement in practice. Furthermore, in any of the papers mentioned above, if the
government has a suﬃcient set of tax instruments, the eﬃcient allocation can be restored.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the environment and derive the first-
best allocation. In Section 3, we present the agents’ decision problems. Section 4 contains the
central bank’s maximization problem and the optimal monetary policy for each pricing protocol.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever.4 In each period three perfectly competitive markets open
sequentially. The first market is a competitive credit market and the third market is a competitive
goods markets. The second market is also a goods market for which we study various market
4The environment combines elements of Lagos and Wright (2005) and Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007). The
Lagos-Wright framework provides a microfoundation for money demand while keeping the distribution of money
balances analytically tractable. Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007) introduce financial intermediation into the
Lagos-Wright framework.
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structures. There is a continuum of two types of agents, called households and sellers. They diﬀer
in terms of when they produce and consume as follows. All agents can produce and consume a
perishable good in the last market. In the second market, households can consume but can not
produce and sellers can produce but can not consume. We assume that all trades in the second
market are anonymous, which rules out trade credit. Since all agents are anonymous and there is a
double coincidence problem, sellers require immediate compensation. So households must pay with
money in market 2, generating an essential role for money.5
The instantaneous utility of a household at date  is
  = ()−  + ( ) (1)
where  is consumption and  production in the last market.6 The quantity  is a household’s
consumption in the second market and  ≥ 0 is a preference parameter. We assume 0  0, 00  0,
0(0) = +∞ and 0(∞) = 0. Furthermore, we assume the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion,
 ≡ −000, is constant and less than one.7 In the last market, the utility function satisfies
0  0, 00  0, 0(0) =∞, and there is a ∗ such that 0(∗) = 1.
The instantaneous utility of a seller at date  is
 = ()−  − (1)  ()  (2)
where  denotes the seller’s production in the second market. Production disutility satisfies 0
00 000 ≥ 0 and  (0) = 0 (0) = 0. Denote the elasticity of marginal cost as  ≡ 000. The
parameter  is a productivity parameter measured in utility terms, where higher values of  be-
5By "essential" we mean that the use of money enlarges the set of incentive-feasible allocations.
6As in Lagos and Wright (2005), these assumptions allow us to obtain a degenerate distribution of money holdings
at the beginning of a period. The diﬀerent utility functions  (·) and  (·) allow us to impose technical conditions
such that in equilibrium all agents produce and consume in the last market.
7This restriction on preferences is not necessary for competitive pricing but is needed for interior solutions under
monopolistic pricing.
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ing associated with higher productivity and thus lower marginal utility costs of production. The
discount factor across dates is  = 1 (1 + ) ∈ (0 1), where  is the time rate of discount.
2.1 Credit market
At the beginning of a period, each household receives an idiosyncratic preference shock  ∈ {0 }
with   0. The probability that  =  is 12, meaning there is an equal probability that a
household wants to consume or not in market 2.8 We call households that consume ‘buyers’, and
those that do not ‘non-buyers’. These preference shocks generate an ex-post ineﬃciency since non-
buyers are holding idle balances, while buyers are cash constrained. This ineﬃciency generates
a welfare-improving role for a credit market where households can borrow or lend money at the
nominal interest rate .
While the goods trade is anonymous, we assume the existence of a record-keeping technology
over financial transactions as in Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007). In all models with credit,
default is a serious issue. To focus on optimal stabilization, we simplify the analysis by assuming
that some mechanism exists that ensures the repayment of loans in the third market.9 One can
show that due to the quasi-linearity of preferences in market 3 there is no gain from multi-period
contracts. Furthermore, since the states are revealed prior to contracting, the one-period nominal
debt contracts that we consider are optimal.
2.2 Shocks
To study the optimal response to shocks, we assume that  and  are stochastic. The random
variable  has support [], 0      ∞, and  has the support [ ], 0      ∞.
Let  = ( ) ∈ Φ be the state in market 1, where Φ = [ ] × [ ] is a closed and compact
8We have also allowed this number to be diﬀerent from 12 and to make it random. However, doing so has added
very little to the analytical and quantitative results. Thus, we chose 12 to simplify notation.
9 In Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007) we derive the equilibrium under the assumption that the only punish-
ment for strategic default is exclusion from the financial system in all future periods.
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subset on R2+. We allow for the shocks to be serially correlated. Let Ω = { −1 } denote
the history of the aggregate state up to period . For notational simplicity let  (|Ω−1) ≡
 (|Ω−1)  (|Ω−1) denote the conditional density function of , where  (|Ω−1) =
 (|Ω−1) . For discussion purposes, we label  as a ‘demand’ shock, while a shock to  is
referred to as a ‘supply’ shock.
2.3 Free entry and search frictions
Entry is costly for sellers. At the beginning of every period after observing the shock, sellers have
to pay the cost   0 in terms of disutility to enter the second market.10 The set of potential sellers
is denoted F . Let S ⊆ F denote the set of sellers that pay the utility cost  to enter the second
market. We assume that the set of potential sellers F is so large that S ⊂ F . Let  denote the
measure of S. The set of households is denoted by H, whose size is normalized to 2. Let B ⊂ H
denote the set of households with  =  (the buyers), where  = 1 is the measure of B.
We introduce search frictions along the lines of Rocheteau and Wright (2005) who assume that
not all sellers that pay the fixed utility cost can trade in market 2. That is, paying  means entry
into the group S of sellers that try to enter market 2. Only S˜ ⊆ S succeed. Denote  (), the
probability of trading in market 2 for a seller that has paid the utility cost. Then,  ()  is the
measure of S˜. We impose the usual assumptions on  (), namely 0 () ≤ 0, 00 () ≥ 0,  () ≤ 1,
 (0) = 1, and  (∞) = 0. Finally, denote Σ ≡ 0 ()  ()  0 as the elasticity of  (). As is
standard in the search literature, we assume this elasticity is constant with −Σ  1.
The probability of trading  () has a natural meaning in matching models with bilateral meet-
ings: It is the probability of having a match. In competitive environments it still captures search
frictions by assuming that, although there is a competitive market, not all firms get the chance to
10Assuming a fixed utility cost  is standard in the labor search literature (e.g., Pissarides 2000, Rogerson, Shimer
and Wright 2005) or in the money search literature (e.g., Rocheteau and Wright 2005). Note that exit is exogenous
and constant in the model, since the entry cost has to be paid every period, which implies that the firm exit rate is
equal to 100%.
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trade in this market (see Rocheteau and Wright (2005)). With 0 ()  0, a seller entering the set S
generates a negative trading externality that the optimal policy must take into account. There are
precedents for such macro externalities in the literature. For example, in endogenous entry/search
models where the terms of trade are determined by bargaining, there may be too many buyers or
sellers relative to the social optimum, depending on the bargaining weight. In these models, devi-
ating from the Friedman rule may be optimal to improve the extensive margin.11 The restriction
that −Σ  1 ensures that this congestion externality is not too large.
2.4 Monetary Policy
We assume a central bank exists that controls the supply of fiat money. We denote the gross
growth rate of the money supply as  (Ω), implying (Ω) =  (Ω)−1, where  (Ω) denotes
the quantity of money per household in market 3 in period  We allow the gross growth rate,
and thus  (Ω), to depend on the entire history of the economy. The central bank implements
its policy by providing state-contingent lump-sum injections of money to the households. Let
1 (Ω)−1 and 3 (Ω)−1 denote the state-contingent cash injections in markets 1 and 3,
where  (Ω) = 1 + 1 (Ω) + 3 (Ω).12
The precise sequence of action after the shocks are observed is as follows. First, the monetary
injection 1 (Ω)−1 occurs. Then, households move to the credit market where non-buyers ( = 0)
lend their idle cash, and buyers ( = ) borrow money. Buyers and sellers then move on to market
2 and trade goods. In the third market, all financial claims are settled and the central bank injects
3 (Ω)−1 units of money per household.
11See our discussion of the literature in the Introduction.
12Note that since the cash injections happen after the demand shock is realized, the central bank could give the
injections to the buyers only. Nevertheless, one can show that such targeted injections do not aﬀect the qualitative
results of our model. Furthermore, untargeted lump-sum injections do not require that the central bank observes
the state of the individual household (buyer or non-buyer).
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2.5 First-best allocation
Our welfare criterion is given by
V =
∞X
=0
W (Ω−1)  (3)
where
W (Ω−1) =
Z
Φ
Z
H∪F
{ [ ()]−  ()}  (|Ω−1)
−
Z
Φ
Z
S
 (|Ω−1)
+
Z
Φ
½Z
B
 £ ()¤  − Z
S˜
(1)  [ ()] 
¾
 (|Ω−1) 
For each , the quantities  ()∈B are the consumption quantities of all households with  =  (the
buyers) and  ()∈S˜ are the production quantities of all sellers that pay the entry cost and are able
to enter market 2. The quantities  ()∈H∪F denote the consumption quantities of all household
and all sellers in market 3, and  ()∈H∪F denote the production quantities of all households and
all sellers in market 3.
An eﬃcient allocation is defined as paths for  ()∈B,  ()∈S˜ ,  ()∈H∪F ,  ()∈H∪F , and
 that maximizes V. In the Appendix, we show that the first-best allocation is a symmetric,
stationary list ©∗ ()  ∗ ()  ∗ ()  ∗ ()ª∈Φ
that satisfies 0 [∗ ()] = 1, ∗ () =  [∗ ()] ∗ () ∗ (), and ∗ () and ∗ () solve
0 £ ()¤ = (1) 0 [ ()] (4)
 =  [ ()] (1 +Σ) (1) {0 [ ()]  ()−  [ ()]}  (5)
The quantity  () is a seller’s production and  () a buyer’s consumption in market 2, and  ()
is consumption in market 3. Equation (4) is a production eﬃciency condition for market 2. It
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requires that the marginal consumption utility equals the marginal production disutility for each
aggregate state. Equation (5) is a zero profit condition that determines entry. It says that the entry
cost must equal the expected profit in utility terms.
Note that ∗ () is not history-dependent — it only depends on the current realization of the ag-
gregate state. The planner faces no intertemporal trade-oﬀs and so he simply chooses the quantities
that maximize welfare state by state for all . This implies that the history of the shock process is
irrelevant for the eﬃcient allocation. In the Appendix, we show that the first-best allocation exists
and is unique. Furthermore, comparative statics on (4)-(5) show that ∗ () is increasing in all of
the shocks, while ∗ () is increasing in , but is ambiguous in .13
Example 1 To help illustrate how our model works, we use a common example throughout the
paper. The functional forms are  £ ()¤ =  ()1−,  [ ()] =  () ,  () = − with
  1   ≥ 0, and the entry cost is  = 1. When  = 0, there is no congestion externality. With
these assumptions, the planner’s allocation is given by
∗ () =
³ +
−1
´ (+) ∗ 
∗ () =
³ −1
+
´(−1+) (1−) ∗ 
where  ≡ [(− 1 + )  + ]−1. From this example, we see that ∗ () is increasing in both shocks.
We also have ∗ () increasing in  as well as  shocks when   1. Thus, the planner wants entry
to be procyclical. Note also that as → 1, costs become linear, profits go to zero, and it is optimal
to have one seller producing for the entire market since entry is costly.
Why does the planner want entry to be procyclical? Consider an increase in . This implies
that households want to consume more, and it is optimal to let them consume more. The planner
can achieve this higher level of output by increasing the amount of goods produced by each seller,
13 If the productivity shock aﬀects the entry cost in the same way as the cost function, then ∗ () is increasing in
 as well.
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i.e., increase  (), or by having more sellers enter and produce, i.e., increase  (). With increasing
marginal costs of production, the planner chooses to alleviate higher production costs on each
individual seller by having more entry, even though it is costly. Hence, the optimal response to an 
shock is to increase both the intensive and extensive margins for output. A similar argument holds
for the other shock.
3 Monetary allocation
Let 3 (Ω) be the time  nominal price of goods in market 3, and thus  (Ω) ≡ 13 (Ω) is the
goods price of money. We study equilibria where end-of-period real money balances are history-
invariant
 (Ω) (Ω) = −1 (Ω−1)−1 (Ω−1)  ∀ Ω (6)
We refer to it as a stationary equilibrium. This implies that in a stationary equilibrium −1 (Ω−1)  (Ω) =
 (Ω). In what follows, we look at a representative period  and work backwards from the third to
the first market to examine the agents’ choices. For notational ease, variables corresponding to the
next period are indexed by +1, and variables corresponding to the previous period are indexed by
−1.
3.1 The third market
In the third market, households consume , produce , and adjust their money balances, taking
into account cash payments or receipts from the credit market. If a household has net borrowing
of  units of money, then he repays (1 + )  units of money.
Consider a stationary equilibrium. Let 1(Ω ) denote a household’s expected lifetime utility
at the beginning of market 1 with  money balances and history Ω in period . Let 3 (Ω  )
denote a household’s expected lifetime utility from entering market 3 in period  with  money
and  loans with history Ω. For notational simplicity, in this section we suppress the dependence
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of the value functions on time.
Bellman’s equation for a household is
3 (Ω ) = max+1 { ()−  +  [1 (+1Ω+1)|Ω]} (7)
s.t. + +1 =  +  [+ 3 (Ω)−1]−  (1 + ) 
where+1 is the money taken into period +1, given the history Ω. Rewriting the budget constraint
in terms of  and substituting into (7) yields
3 (Ω ) =  [+ 3 (Ω)−1 − (1 + ) ]
+ max+1 { ()− − +1 +  [1 (+1Ω+1)|Ω]} 
The first-order conditions are 0 (∗) = 1, meaning ∗ is constant and
−+  [ 1 (+1Ω+1)|Ω] = 0 (8)
where the superscript denotes the partial derivative with respect to the argument . Thus,  1
is the marginal value of taking an additional unit of money into the first market in period  + 1.
Since the choice of +1 is independent of , all households enter the following period with the
same amount of money.
The envelope conditions are
 3 (Ω ) = ;  3 (Ω ) = − (1 + )  (9)
As in Lagos and Wright (2005), the value function is linear in wealth.
Let 1 (Ω)   ∈ {0 1}  denote a seller’s expected lifetime utility at the beginning of market 1
given Ω. If  = 1, the seller has paid the entry cost  and, if  = 0, he has not. Note that we have
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also taken into account that sellers bring no money into market 1. Since sellers do not participate
in the first market, we have 1 (Ω) =2 (Ω). Let 3 (Ω) denote a seller’s expected lifetime
utility from entering market 3 with  units of money given Ω. Bellman’s equation for a seller is
3 (Ω) = max { ()−  +  [1 (+1Ω+1)|Ω]}
s.t.  =  + 
Rewriting the budget constraint in terms of  and substituting into the objective function yields
3 (Ω) = +max { ()− +  [1 (+1Ω+1)|Ω]}  (10)
The first-order condition is 0 (∗) = 1. The envelope condition for a seller is
 03 (Ω) =  (11)
As was the case for households, the value function is linear in .
3.2 The second market
There are 3 types of agents in the second market: buyers (), non-buyers () and sellers (). Let
2 (Ω  ) denote the value function of a household of type  =  . Let  and , respectively,
denote the quantities consumed by a buyer and produced by a seller, and let  be the nominal price
of goods.
Since non-buyers neither consume nor produce, the Bellman equation for this household is simply
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2 (Ω  ) = 3 (Ω ). The one for a buyer household is
2 (Ω  ) = max 
¡¢+ 3 ¡− Ω ¢
s.t.  ≤ 
Using (9) the buyer’s first-order condition can be written as
 = 0 ¡¢−   ∈ Φ (12)
where  is the multiplier on the buyer’s budget constraint. If the budget constraint is not binding,
then 0 ¡¢ = . If it is binding, then 0 ¡¢   and the buyer spends all of his money; i.e.,
 = . In the first case, the buyer equates the marginal rate of substitution between market
2 goods and market 3 goods to the relative price of goods in the two markets.14 In the latter
case, the agent is at a ‘corner’. In what follows, let  2 (Ω  ) denote the partial derivative of
2 (+ Ω  ) with respect to the first argument; i.e., with respect to , and let  2 (Ω  )
denote the partial derivative with respect to the third argument, i.e., .
The marginal value of a loan is the same for all households and so for  =  
 2 (Ω  ) = − (1 + ) (13)
Using the envelope theorem and equations (9) and (12), the marginal values of money for  =  
are
 2 (Ω  ) = 0
¡¢  (14)
 2 (Ω  ) =  (15)
14The MRS between the two markets is 0  () 0 [ ()]  But from the optimization problem in market 3,
0 [ ()] = 1 for all .
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We now describe the entry behavior of the sellers in market 2. The Bellman equation for a seller
who has paid the entry cost is
2 (1Ω) =  ()max {− (1)  () +3 (Ω)}+ [1−  ()]3 (0Ω)  (16)
subject to the pricing protocol which we discuss below. The term  is the money receipts from
selling output.
The Bellman equation for a seller who does not pay the entry cost satisfies2 (0Ω) =3 (0Ω).
At the beginning of the period, sellers observe the current state and the representative seller chooses
to enter market 2 with probability  (Ω) taking the entry choices of other sellers as given. Let N
denote the measure of potential sellers. Then, since we focus on symmetric equilibria, he expects a
measure  (Ω) = Π (Ω)N of sellers entering, where Π (Ω) is the entering decision of all other sellers.
Define
D [Π (Ω)N] ≡2 (1Ω)−2 (0Ω)−  (17)
Equation (17) is the expected gain from entering the market. The optimal choice of  satisfies
 (Ω) = 1 if D [Π (Ω)N]  0
 (Ω) = 0 if D [Π (Ω)N]  0
 (Ω) ∈ [0 1] otherwise.
We look for symmetric Nash equilibria where all sellers choose the same entry probability  (Ω).
Moreover, the value(s) of Π (Ω) that sustain a symmetric Nash equilibrium are defined as follows:
Π (Ω) = 1 if D(N) ≥ 0
Π (Ω) = 0 if D(0) ≤ 0
D [Π (Ω)N] = 0 otherwise.
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Throughout the paper, we focus on equilibria where D [Π (Ω)N] = 0 in all states.15 Using the
expressions for 2 (1Ω), 2 (0Ω) and (10), we then obtain the free entry condition
 =  () [ − (1)  ()]  (18)
where the RHS is expected profits. Note that we have suppressed the dependence of  and  on
 for notational convenience. Since the entry cost has to be paid each period, only current profits
enter into (18). Free entry requires that expected profits in market 2 equal the entry cost. Revenue
after history Ω, measured in utility, is given by , where  is the nominal price of goods in market
2, and  is the real price of money in the last market, while costs in utility are − (1)  (). Note
that  = 3 is the relative price of goods across markets 2 and 3.
3.3 The credit market
A household which has  money at the opening of the first market has expected lifetime utility
 [1 (Ω)] =
Z
Φ
[052 (+ Ω  ) + 052 (+ Ω  )]  (|Ω−1)  (19)
Once trading types are realized, a household of type  =   solves
max 2 (+ Ω  )  0 ≤ + 
The constraint means that money holdings  +  cannot be negative; i.e., that the household
cannot lend out more money than he holds when entering the credit market. Note that there is no
borrowing constraint since we assume full enforcement of repayment of loans. Then, the first-order
15This simply requires that the measure of potential sellers is suﬃciently large so that there is no state for which
all of them want to enter. This is a standard assumption in the labor search literature.
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condition is
 2 (+ Ω  ) +  2 (+ Ω  ) +  () = 0
where  () is the multiplier on the household’s non-negativity constraint. It is obvious that house-
holds with  =  will become borrowers, while those with  = 0 become lenders. Consequently, we
have  () = 0 and  ()  0.
Using (13)-(15), the first-order conditions can be written as
0 ¡¢ =  (1 + ) (20)
 () =  (21)
To derive the expected marginal value of money at the beginning of the period, take the derivative
of (19) with respect to  to get
 [1 (Ω)] =
Z
Φ
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
05 [ 2 (+ Ω  ) +  ()]+
05 [ 2 (+ Ω  ) +  ()]
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
 (|Ω−1) 
Using (13)-(15), this expression can be written as follows
 [1 (Ω)] =
Z
Φ
©
05 £0 ¡¢ +  ()¤+ 05 [+  ()]ª  (|Ω−1) 
Finally, noting that  () = 0 and using equations (20) and (21), the expected marginal value of
money satisfies
 [ 1 (Ω)|Ω−1] =
Z
Φ
£0 ¡¢ ¤  (|Ω−1)  (22)
noting that Ω = {Ω−1}. Diﬀerentiating (22) shows that the value function is concave in .
Use (8), lagged one period, to eliminate  [ 1 (Ω)|Ω−1] from (22). Then, divide the resulting
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expression by −1 and rewrite to get
1 = 
Z
Φ
0 ¡¢
 (Ω)  (|Ω−1)  (23)
3.4 Pricing protocols
We now discuss three pricing protocols: competitive pricing, state-contingent monopoly pricing
and non-state-contingent monopoly pricing. We refer to this last pricing protocol as price posting.
Competitive pricing is our benchmark. We are interested in the other two protocols, because they
allow us to refer our results to New Keynesian models which are characterized by monopoly pricing
and sticky prices (price posting).
For each pricing protocol, we have
 =  ()  for all  (24)
For competitive pricing, this is simply the market clearing condition in market 2.
For monopoly pricing, this equation also holds because we assume a matching process that
allocates [ () ]−1 buyers to each seller. The benefits of this matching rule are threefold. First,
the first-best allocation described in Section 3 is replicated if the monopoly pricing distortion is
eliminated. Second, in search-theoretic models of money, bilateral matching creates monopoly
power for both buyers and sellers in the bargaining process. This matching rule with monopoly
pricing eliminates the monopsony power of the buyer and is consistent with the pricing frictions
in New Keynesian models. Third, the allocation is easily compared to the flexible price allocation,
since the only diﬀerence is the pricing mechanism.16
16This assumption is simply made to compare the allocation with monopoly pricing to one with competitive pricing.
For this reason, we ignore issues involving 1   [ (Ω)]  (Ω).
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Competitive pricing With price taking, a seller’s maximization problem in market 2 is
max {− (1)  () +3 (Ω)} 
Using (11), the first-order condition yields the pricing equation
 = (1) 
0 ()
  (25)
We can then combine (20) and (25) to get an expression for the interest rate
1 +  = 
0 [ () ]
(1) 0 ()  (26)
State-contingent monopoly pricing With state-contingent monopoly pricing, since a seller
faces [ () ]−1 buyers, the maximization problem is
max {− (1)  () +3 (Ω)}
 0 [ () ] =  (1 + ) 
where the constraint is the buyer’s first-order condition for consumption. The solution yields the
pricing equation17
 = (1) 
0 ()
 (1−)  (27)
We can then combine (20) and (27) to get an expression for the interest rate
1 +  = (1−
) 0 [ () ]
(1) 0 () . (28)
17Given our simple approach to generating monopoly power, the gross markup is given by (1−)−1, which is
constant. Changing the matching function such that the markup depends negatively on entry, as in Jaimovich and
Floettoto (2008), would be an interesting extension.
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Price posting We now assume that sellers must set the price before the realization of the current
state, . However, they can use the information on the history of the aggregate state up to time
 − 1, Ω−1, in forming their expectations of future profits. They commit to produce whatever is
demanded in state  at the posted price,  (Ω−1). However, upon seeing the shock, they can choose
to enter and try to sell at the posted price. With this last assumption, no seller will experience
negative expected profits in equilibrium.18 The seller’s maximization problem is
max(Ω−1)
Z
Φ
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
 (Ω) [ (Ω)] {3 [ (Ω−1)  (Ω) Ω]− (1)  [ (Ω)]}
+ {1−  (Ω) [ (Ω)]}3 (0Ω)
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
 (|Ω−1)
 0 { [ (Ω)]  (Ω)  (Ω)} =  (Ω−1) (Ω) [1 +  (Ω)] for all 
where demand in each state satisfies the buyer’s first-order condition for consumption; i.e., it satisfies
the above constraints. The first-order condition for  yields the pricing equation
 (Ω−1) =
Z
Ω
[(Ω)](Ω)(Ω)(1)0[(Ω)] (|Ω−1)
(1−)
Z
Ω
(Ω)[(Ω)](Ω)(Ω) (|Ω−1)
 (29)
where we have taken into account that in a symmetric equilibrium  (Ω) =  (Ω) N. Equation (29)
then replaces  in (23). We can then combine (20) and (29) to get an expression for the interest
rate
1 +  (Ω) =
(1−)0{[(Ω)](Ω)(Ω)}
Z
Ω
(Ω)[(Ω)](Ω)(Ω) (|Ω−1)
(Ω)
Z
Ω
[(Ω)](Ω)(Ω)(1)0[(Ω)] (|Ω−1)
 (30)
4 Optimal stabilization
We now derive the optimal stabilization policy in symmetric stationary monetary equilibrium. To
study this problem, we pursue the primal approach to the Ramsey problem where the central bank
18For this case, we have in mind restaurants who print their menus in advance but upon seeing the state of the
economy can choose to open or not.
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chooses the quantities , ,  ,   to maximize (3) subject to the free entry condition (18),
the relevant pricing protocol, and the resource constraints. In the appendix, we show that these
quantities can be implemented with history-dependent injections 1 (Ω) and 3 (Ω) that satisfy
 ≥ 0 and (23). With competitive pricing the pricing protocol is (25), with state-contingent
monopoly pricing it is (27), and with price posting it is (29). It should be clear that in all cases
 = ∗ and  is determined by the household’s budget constraint once all of the other quantities
are chosen. Finally, from (24),  is determined once we have  and . So the central bank’s
problem reduces to choices of  and .
Proposition 1 Consider the case of competitive pricing. The constrained optimal allocation is
stationary and depends only on the current state . With 0 [ ()] = 0,  () = 0,  () = ∗ ()
and  () = ∗ () for all states. With 0 [ ()]  0,  ()  0,  ()  ∗ () and  ()  ∗ ()
for all states.
The allocation is stationary and only depends on the current state in both cases despite the
persistence of the shocks. The reason is that the only equation for which the persistence of the
shocks matters is the money demand equation (23). Given its optimal choices { ()   ()}∈Φ,
the central bank then chooses  (Ω) to ensure (23). Thus, any information content provided by the
persistence of the shocks is oﬀset by choosing the stochastic inflation rate appropriately.
With 0 [ ()] = 0, the Friedman rule replicates the first-best allocation. This can be seen by
noting that from (26) when  () = 0,  () = ∗ (). In the proof of Proposition 1, we show that
the zero profit condition that determines entry satisfies
 () = [0 ()  −  ()]  (31)
Thus, with 0 [ ()] = 0 the entry condition for competitive pricing (31) replicates (5) at  () =
∗ (). The intuition is that if 0 [ ()] = 0, there is no congestion externality, and the only friction
is the cost of holding money across periods. Under the Friedman rule the agents get compensated
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for these costs and so agents perfectly self-insure against all shocks. Consequently, there are no
welfare gains from stabilization policies. Note that Proposition 1 also holds in a model where the
number of sellers is exogenously given.
With 0 [ ()]  0, the central bank never chooses  () = 0. The reason is the congestion
externality. Sellers ignore how their entry lowers the expected profits of other sellers. Consequently,
in equilibrium there are too many sellers and the aggregate entry cost  () is too high relative
to the social optimum. To see why a deviation from the Friedman rule is optimal, assume that the
central bank sets  () = 0, which generates the eﬃcient quantity  () = ∗ () in all states. Now
consider a reduction in  () when  () = 0. By marginally reducing  (),  () is also marginally
reduced, but the first-order welfare loss from doing so is zero. The reduction in  () reduces
expected profits for sellers and thus entry declines. This produces a first-order gain in welfare from
reducing  (). This is achieved by increasing  () above zero.
Although the argument above does not require  ()  0 for all states, nevertheless it is optimal to
do so. The reason is that the central bank wants to smooth consumption across states. Intuitively,
consider two states  0 ∈ Φ with  () = 0 implying  () = ∗ (), and  (0)  0 implying
 (0)  ∗ (0). Then, the first-order loss from decreasing  () is zero, while there is a first-order
gain from increasing  (0). This gain can be accomplished by increasing  () and lowering  (0).
Thus, the central bank’s optimal policy is to set  ()  0 for all states.
We find this result interesting because it is very reminiscent of the view that the Federal Reserve
kept interest rates “too low for too long” from 2003-2005. In short, this argument implies the Fed
should have raised interest rates to choke oﬀ entry into the housing and commercial property
markets. It is important to note that this argument requires some type of congestion externality
to make entry ineﬃcient. Entry per se is not enough.
Lastly, with the central bank’s optimal interest rate policy  ()  () has the same sign as
 ()  (), where  is the elasticity of the marginal cost function. Thus, if the elasticity of
the marginal cost function is constant, we have  ()  () = 0, and the central bank perfectly
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smooths interest rates. The central bank moves the nominal interest rate in a countercyclical fashion
when  ()  ()  0 and in a pro-cyclical manner when the opposite is true.
Example 2 Using our assumed functional forms, the central bank’s optimal allocation is given by
 () =
³ +
+
´ ³
1
1+
´ ∗ ()  ∗ ()
 () =
³
1
1+
´(1−) ³ +

´ ∗ ()  ∗ ()
 () = (−1)+  0
This example illustrates the basic insight of the model. When entry is endogenous, too much entry
occurs. To reduce entry, the central bank inflates in order to drive up nominal interest rates. This
lowers consumption of market 2 goods and lowers profits for sellers. Expected lower profits reduce
entry by sellers. Since  () = − 1 for these functional forms, the optimal nominal interest rate
is constant across states. Note also that when there are no search externalities; i.e., when  = 0,
then  () = ∗ (),  = ∗ and  () = 0. Again, the central bank wants entry to be procyclical.
We next consider the case of state-contingent monopoly pricing.
Proposition 2 Consider the case of state-contingent monopoly pricing. The constrained optimal
allocation is stationary and depends only on the current state . With 0 () = 0,  () = 0,
 ()  ∗ () and  ()  ∗ () for all states. With 0 ()  0,  ()  0,  ()  ∗ () and
 ()  ∗ () for all states.
With monopoly pricing and 0 () = 0, the Friedman rule is again optimal. However, the
first-best allocation cannot be achieved since the monopoly pricing distortion causes  () to be
ineﬃciently low and  () to be ineﬃciently high in all states.
With endogenous entry, once again, due to the entry externality, the central bank pushes up
interest rates to reduce profits and thus entry. As with competitive pricing, entry is higher than
the social optimum. Also, production is lower than ∗ and .
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Finally, we study the case of non-state-contingent monopoly pricing.
Proposition 3 Consider the case of price posting. In this case, the central bank replicates the
optimal allocation that occurs under state-contingent monopoly pricing.
Why is the central bank able to replicate the posting allocation? Posting simply imposes a
constraint on the behavior of  in market 2. However, the central bank only cares about the relative
price  ()  () between market 2 and market 3. As long as that is flexible, the central bank can
replicate the state-contingent monopoly price allocation.
Discussion We first compare our results to Ireland (1996), since our paper is most closely related
to his article. Ireland (1996) studies optimal stabilization policies when firms set nominal prices
one period in advance, which corresponds to price posting in our model. He finds that when the
economy is subject to aggregate demand shocks, the optimal policy is to make the average money
growth rate small. Under this policy, there is no need to respond actively to these shocks. He also
reports that one class of optimal policies is the constant money growth rate  =  advocated by
Friedman (1969). Under this policy, the opportunity cost of holding money is zero and so agents
are willing to hold a stock of real balances that is large enough to oﬀset any demand shocks.19 In
the absence of a congestion externality, we find the same result for all three pricing protocols. In
this case, the optimal policy is the Friedman rule; i.e., to set  () = 0.
Khan, King and Wolman (2003) study a monetary economy with imperfect competition and
sticky prices. They also find that with fully flexible prices the Friedman rule is optimal but cannot
achieve the first-best allocation because of monopolistic distortion in the price setting. With costly
price setting, the optimal nominal interest rate is positive. Furthermore, they find that in response
to real and nominal aggregate shocks, the optimal policy is to stabilize the price level around a
deflationary trend path.
19 In contrast, for aggregate supply shocks he finds that the optimal policy requires the money supply to respond
actively and that the optimal policy is procyclical.
27
The key diﬀerence between our approach and the New Keynesian literature - as represented by
Khan, King and Wolman (2003) - is that these models have staggered price stickiness which results
in a non-degenerate distribution of prices. This prevents the central bank from getting the relative
price between flexible and sticky prices ‘right’. The reason is that there are many relative prices
that are out of alignment, whereas we only have one. To address this ineﬃciency the central bank
essentially stabilizes the price level and lets output move.
In our model, the optimal policy requires inflation to be stochastic so the price level moves
around. Expected inflation is what changes the real value of money and thus adjusts the liquidity
constraints. This result is very diﬀerent from what one obtains in New Keynesian models. In those
models, inflation distorts relative prices due to the stickiness. So to keep output close to the eﬃcient
level, the central bank strongly stabilizes the price level to the point that it looks like price level
targeting. However, in our paper, the reverse is true — we optimally choose stochastic inflation to
move allocations closer to the eﬃcient level. The implementation scheme and associated stochastic
inflation rate that yields the optimal allocation is characterized below.
Implementation In the appendix, we derive implementation schemes for each pricing protocol
that supports the desired allocation when 0 [ ()]  0. The schemes are not unique, since the
transfers are nominal injections and the central bank only cares about the relative transfers across
states.
The key thing to note is that the inflation rate is state-dependent and serially correlated. The
reason for the serial correlation is as follows. The optimal allocation associated with state  does not
depend on Ω−1. However, Ω−1 contains information about the future state  and this aﬀects agents’
demand for real balances at time  − 1, as is shown by (23). In order to oﬀset any informational
value that history has on current money demand, the central bank oﬀers a menu of state-contingent
transfers that makes the real value of money constant regardless of Ω−1.
Note that for general shock processes, the central bank must promise a sequence of transfers for
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all possible histories. This seems to be an unrealistic implementation policy in practice. However,
if the shocks are Markovian, then the central bank’s transfers only need to be conditioned on the
current and previous state — a much simpler set of transfers to implement.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a DSGE model where money is essential for trade and where a search
externality creates ‘congestion’ which causes aggregate output to be ineﬃcient. We introduce a
variety of well-defined aggregate shocks that generate consumption risk for households. Due to the
informational frictions that give rise to money, households are unable to perfectly insure themselves
against these shocks. This gives rise to a welfare improving role for monetary policy that works by
adjusting the nominal interest rate in response to these shocks. In this setting, our basic results
concerning the optimal stabilization policy are as follows. With a fixed probability of trading, the
optimal monetary policy is to run the Friedman rule and set the nominal interest rate to zero
in all states. This is true for all three pricing protocols. When the trading probability depends
on aggregate entry, a congestion externality arises that makes entry ineﬃciently high. Thus, the
central bank finds it optimal to raise interest rates above zero in all states in order to reduce profits
and deter entry even though it lowers average consumption. Once again, this is true for all pricing
protocols. In short, the zero lower bound is never a binding constraint in our model. The key to
implementing the desired allocation is to manipulate the relative price of goods across markets by
choosing state-dependent nominal interest rates.
There are many extensions of this model that would be interesting to pursue. For example, how
would the optimal policy be aﬀected if the repayment of loans were endogenous? In particular,
does the risk of default alter stabilization? Given the events of 2007-2009, the role of default on
stabilization policy appears to be an important issue. Furthermore, we assume that the shocks are
known to the central bank. An interesting question is what is the optimal policy if the central bank
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has imperfect information about the nature of the aggregate shocks? How would the existence of
inside money aﬀect the equilibrium and optimal policy? For example, would inside money act as
an automatic stabilizer, eliminating the need for the central bank to stabilize the economy?
Finally, one could also use our framework to address the classical question raised in Lucas (1987):
how much is the welfare gain associated with eliminating the business cycle? In the context of our
model, it would mean to calculate the benefits of applying the optimal stabilization policy versus
a passive policy, where the central bank does not intervene in response to aggregate productivity
and preference shocks. Lucas (1987) and the following literature, surveyed in Barlevy (2005), found
that the welfare benefits of eliminating the business cycle are surprisingly small. An interesting
research question would be to see whether a microfounded framework with search externalities
would generate larger benefits.
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Appendix
First-best allocation The planner chooses the allocation
 ≡
h
 ()∈B   ()∈S˜   ()∈H∪F   ()∈H∪F
i
and the measures of sellers  who enter the market for each period. The quantities  ()∈B are the
consumption quantities of all households with  =  (the buyers), and  ()∈S˜ are the production
quantities of all sellers that pay the entry cost and are able to enter market 2, while  ()∈H∪F
are the consumption quantities of all household, and all sellers in market 3, and  ()∈H∪F are the
production quantities of all households and sellers in market 3. The planner is constrained that the
allocation has to be feasible. In the second and third markets, respectively, for each state  ∈ Ω
and each date , this requires that
Z
B
 ()  ≤
Z
S˜
 ()  (32)Z
H∪F
 ()  ≤
Z
H∪F
 ()  (33)
An eﬃcient allocation is defined as paths for
 ()∈B   ()∈S˜   ()∈H∪F   ()∈H∪F  and 
that maximize (3) subject to (32) and(33) and an initial aggregate state 0. One can easily show that
it is optimal to treat all agents of the same type equally. Moreover, using (32) it is straightforward
to show that the planner allocation yields
Z
Φ
Z
H∪F
[ ()− ]  (|Ω−1) =
Z
H∪F
 (∗)− ∗
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which is not state-contingent so we can ignore this term in (3). Accordingly, the Lagrangian of the
planner problem is
 =
Z
Φ
© ¡¢−  ()  () ª  (|Ω−1)
−
Z
Φ
 (|Ω−1) + 
£ ()  −  ¤ 
The FOCs for this problem after simplifications are
0 = 0 ¡¢− 
0 =  −  () 
0 =  () (1 +Σ) [0 ()  −  ()]  − 
0 =  ()  −  
for all . It is clear from these FOC that the optimal allocation is independent of Ω−1 and stationary
for all  ∈ Φ, implying that, for a given state ,  =  (),  =  (),  =  (),  =  () for
all . Furthermore, an interior solution for  requires −Σ  1, which we have assumed.
Define  [ ()] ≡  [ ()] with 0 ()  0. To prove existence and uniqueness of the first-best
allocation, we can rearrange (4)-(5) as follows
0 { [ ()]  ()  ()}
0 [ ()]  − 1 = 0 (34)
 [ ()]− (1 +Σ) {0 [ ()]  ()−  [ ()]}  = 0 (35)
(34) is a strictly decreasing function in [ ()   ()] space. It approaches infinity as  () approaches
zero and approaches zero as  () goes to infinity. If 0 [ ()]  0, (35) is strictly increasing in
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[ ()   ()] space. Moreover, at  () = 0 there exists a finite  ()  0 that solves
 [ ()]− (1 +Σ) (1) {0 [ ()]  ()−  [ ()]} = 0
Hence, a unique solution [∗ ()  ∗ ()] exists. If  [ ()] = , (35) is independent of  () implying
that for   +∞, a unique solution [∗ ()  ∗ ()] exists.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof involves three steps. We first derive the solution to the
central bank’s problem. We then demonstrate that the solution satisfies  () ≥ 0. Finally, we show
that there exists a transfer scheme 1 (Ω) and 3 (Ω) that implements the central bank’s allocation
for each Ω and satisfies (23).
First step. The central bank allocation has to satisfy two constraints. The first constraint is
the entry condition (18), which holds in each state. The second constraint is the pricing equation
(25), which also holds in each state. We can use (18) to eliminate  (Ω) (Ω) from (25) to get
 () = [0 ()  −  ()]  (36)
The central bank then maximizes (3) subject to (36). Using (33), it is straightforward to show that
the optimal policy yields
Z
Φ
Z
H∪F
[ ()− ]  (|Ω−1) =
Z
H∪F
 (∗)− ∗
which is not state-contingent or dependent on monetary policy, so we can ignore this term in (3).
Consequently, using (24), the central bank’s problem reduces to
V =
∞X
=0

Z
Φ
© ¡¢−  ()  () ª  (|Ω−1)
−
∞X
=0

Z
Φ
 ()  ()  (|Ω−1) 
35
The Lagrangian is
 =
∞X
=0

Z
Φ
© ¡¢−  ()  () ª  (|Ω−1)
−
∞X
=0

Z
Φ
 ()  ()  (|Ω−1)
+
∞X
=0

Z
Φ

£ ()  −  ¤  (|Ω−1)
+
∞X
=0

Z
Φ
ˆ { ()− [0 ()  −  ()] }  (|Ω−1) 
where  and ˆ ≡  () is the time  Lagrangian multiplier for state . Then for all  the
central bank’s allocation satisfies
0 = 0 ¡¢− (1 + ) 0 ()  (37)
0 = 0 ¡¢  −  ()  −  ()− (1 +Σ)−1 (1− ) 0 () (38)
0 =  ()− [0 ()  −  ()]  (39)
0 =  −  ()  (40)
where (37) and (38) are the first-order conditions for  and , respectively. Note that there are
no terms involving past or future values in (37)-(39), so the allocation is stationary. Hence, as with
the planner, the central bank faces no intertemporal trade-oﬀs and so for each aggregate state  we
have  =  () and  =  (). For notational convenience we now drop the dependence of  and 
on  with the understanding that they are state-dependent.
Use (37) and (39) to write (38) as follows
 = 
0 ()
 (1 +Σ) 0 () + 0 ()  (41)
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Note that   1. Using (41) to replace  in (37),  and  satisfy
0 [ () ]
(1) 0 () − 1 =
0 ()
 (1 +Σ) (1) 0 ()  + 0 () (42)
 () = [0 ()  −  ()]  (43)
In ( ) space, (42) approaches infinity as  approaches zero and it approaches zero as  goes to
infinity. If 0 ()  0, (43) is strictly increasing and  ≥ 0 solves − [0 ()  −  ()]  = 0 at  = 0.
Hence, a solution ( ) exists. If 0 () = 0, then  () = , (43) is independent of  implying that
for   +∞, a solution ( ) exists. If (42) is strictly decreasing in ( ) space, the equilibrium is
unique.
Comparing these two expressions to the first-best allocation (34)-(35), it is straightforward to
show that   ∗.
We now prove that  ≥ ∗. Suppose that the central bank is constrained to implement ∗. Then,
 solves
 (∗)− [0 ()  −  ()]  = 0 (44)
Let  denote the value of  that solves (44) and let  ≡ ∗. From (35), it is clear that   ∗.
Now let the central bank choose  and . Assume — contrary to the claim in the Proposition —
that the optimal allocation satisfies    ≡ ∗. Then, from (44),   . It is evident that the
allocation ( ) has lower welfare than ( ), since     ∗ and    = ∗. Thus, in any
competitive equilibrium  ≥ ∗.
Second step. From (26) we have 1 +  = 0[()]0() . Hence, using (42) yields
 = 
0 ()
 (1 +Σ) 0 () + 0 () 
Consequently, if 0 ()  0,   0 in all states. If 0 () = 0,  () = 0 in all states. Note that
if 0 ()  () =  and 0 ()  () =   1 are constants, then  =  − 1 and the free entry
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condition reduces to  () = ( − 1)  () . It then follows that  is constant and given by
 =  ( − 1)
(1 +Σ) + 
Third step. We now show that a set of transfers 1 (Ω) and 3 (Ω) exists that implement the
central bank’s allocation and satisfy (23). Using (24) and (25), we can write (23) as follows:
1 = 
Z
Φ
½0 { [ ()]  ()  ()}
 (Ω) 0 [ ()]
¾
 (|Ω−1)  (45)
We first consider the case 0 () = 0. In this case, (45) reduces to
1 = 
Z
Φ
1
 (Ω) (|Ω−1) = 
Z
Φ
1
1 + 1 (Ω) + 3 (Ω) (|Ω−1) 
It is clear that any set of transfers 1 (Ω) and 3 (Ω) that satisfies  (Ω) = 1 + 1 (Ω) + 3 (Ω) = 
for all Ω implements the central bank’s allocation.
Consider next the case 0 ()  0. Assume that the transfers are such that the agents have just
enough money to buy  () =  [ ()]  ()  () in each state; i.e.,  (Ω)  () =−1 [1 + 1 (Ω)].
From the pricing equation (25) we can write this expression as follows
 () 0 [ ()]  =  (Ω)−1 [1 + 1 (Ω)] . (46)
Let  ≡  (Ω) (Ω) =  (Ω)−1 [1 + 1 (Ω) + 3 (Ω)]. Using (46) we get
 =  () 0 [ ()] +  (Ω)−13 (Ω)  (47)
We have one degree of freedom for the choice of 3 (Ω). Assume the central bank conditions the
transfers on the  and − 1 shocks for any Ω−2. We then have 3 (Ω) = 3 ( −1Ω−2). Consider
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the state  = ( ) and set 3 ( Ω−2) = 0. This pins down the real stock of money
 =  () 0 [ ()] . This implies  ( Ω−2) = 1 + 1 ( Ω−2) which remains to
be determined. We will return to this later. Now, using the value of  in (47) for −1 =  yields
3 ( Ω−2) = [1 + 1 ( Ω−2)]
n ()0[()]
()0[()] − 1
o

which gives us the realized money growth rate
 (Ω−2) = [1 + 1 (Ω−2)] ()0[()]()0[()] 
and from the money demand equation we get
1 = 
Z
Φ
0[()]()
()0[()]
(|Ω−2)
1+1()  (48)
This equation imposes a restriction on the choice of the vector {1 ( )}∈Φ  One such vector
choice is 1 ( ) = 1 for all . This pins down 1 ( ) and requires
1 = 
Z
Φ
0[()]()
()0[()]  (|Ω−2)  − 1
Now consider an arbitrary −1 Again we obtain
3 (−1Ω−2) = [1 + 1 ( −1Ω−2)]
n ()0[()]
()0[()] − 1
o

which gives us the following
 (−1Ω−2) = [1 + 1 (−1Ω−2)] ()0[()]()0[()] 
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and the money demand equation is
1 = 
Z
Φ
½
0[()]()
()0[()]
¾
(|−1Ω−2)
1+1(−1)  (49)
Thus, for both (48) and (49) to hold as it does for  we must have
1 + 1 ( −1Ω−2) =  (|−1Ω−2) (|Ω−2) [1 + 1 ( Ω−2)] ∀−1
This pins down every transfer as a function of 1 ( Ω−2). Thus, for 1 ( Ω−2) = 1 we
have the transfer scheme
1 + 1 (Ω) =  (|−1Ω−2) (|Ω−2) (1 + 1)
3 (Ω) = (1 + 1) (|−1Ω−2)(|Ω−2)
n ()0[()]
()0[()] − 1
o

and the stochastic inflation rate
 (Ω) = (1 + 1) (|−1Ω−2)(|Ω−2) 
()0[()]
()0[()] 
The remaining endogenous variables are then
 (Ω) = ()0[()]−1(1+1) (|−1Ω−2)(|Ω−2) and  (Ω) =−1 (1+1)(|−1Ω−2)()(|Ω−2) 
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof follows along the lines of the proof of Proposition 1.
First step. The central bank allocation has to satisfy two constraints. The first constraint is
the entry condition (18), which holds in each state. The second constraint is the pricing equation
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(27), which also holds in each state. We can use (18) to eliminate  from (27) to get
 () =
h
0 ()  (1−)−1 −  ()
i
 (50)
Notice the appearance of the markup (1−)−1, which is absent from (36).
The optimal allocation solves
0 =
0 ¡¢
(1) 0 [ ()] − 1− 
 +
1− (51)
0 = 0 ¡¢  −  ()  −  ()− (1− ) (1 + Σ)−1 0 () (52)
0 =  ()−
h
0 ()  (1−)−1 −  ()
i
 (53)
0 =  −  ()  (54)
Note that for  = 0 (51)-(53) and (37)-(39) are identical. Again, because there are no terms
involving past or future values, the solution to (51)-(53) is independent of  and Ω, so it is therefore
stationary. Use (51) and (53) to write (52) as follows
 = 
 (1 +Σ) 0 ()  + (1−) 0 ()
( +) (1 +Σ) 0 ()  + (1−) 0 ()  (55)
Use (55) to replace  in (51). Then,  and  solve
0 {[ () ] }
0 ()  − 1 =
³
+
1−
´ h (1+Σ)0()+(1−)0()
(+)(1+Σ)0()+(1−)0()
i
(56)
 ()−
h
0 ()  (1−)−1 −  ()
i
 = 0 (57)
Comparing these two expressions to the first-best allocation (34)-(35), it is straightforward to show
that   ∗. To establish that  ≥ ∗, we can replicate the same proof as in the case of competitive
pricing above.
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Second step. Since (38) and (52) are identical and   1, we can replicate the proof of Step 2
of Proposition 2 one for one.
Third step. We now show that a set of transfers 1 (Ω) and 3 (Ω) exists that implement the
central bank’s allocation and satisfy (23). Using (24) and (27), we can write (23) as follows:
1 =  (1−)
Z
Φ
0 { [ ()]  ()  ()}
 (Ω) (1) 0 [ ()] 
¡|Ω−1¢ (58)
We first consider the case 0 () = 0. Since (1−) 0 { [ ()]  ()  ()} = (1) 0 [ ()] under
the central bank’s allocation, (58) reduces to
1 = 
Z
Φ
1
 (Ω) (|Ω−1) = 
Z
Φ
1
1 + 1 (Ω) + 3 (Ω) (|Ω−1) 
It is clear that any set of transfers 1 (Ω) and 3 (Ω) that satisfies  (Ω) = 1 + 1 (Ω) + 3 (Ω) = 
for all  = Φ implements the central bank’s allocation.
Consider next the case 0 ()  0. Assume that the transfers are such that the agents have just
enough money to buy  () in each state; i.e.,  (Ω)  () = −1 [1 + 1 (Ω)]. From the pricing
equation (27), we can write this expression as follows
(1−)−1  () 0 [ ()]  =  (Ω)−1 [1 + 1 (Ω)] . (59)
Since  =  (Ω)−1 [1 + 1 (Ω) + 3 (Ω)], using (46) we get (47). As before, assume the central
bank mainly conditions the money growth rate on the shocks at  and  − 1. Consider the state
 = ( ) and set 3 ( ) = 0. Thus,  = (1−)−1  () 0 [ ()]  is the real
stock of money. We then have
(1−)−1  () 0 [ ()]  =  (Ω)−1 [1 + 1 (Ω) + 3 (Ω)] 
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Using this expression and (59) we can obtain 3 ( ) as a function of 1 ()
3 ( Ω−2) = [1 + 1 ( Ω−2)]
n ()0[()]
()0[()] − 1
o
 (60)
The realized money growth satisfies
 (Ω−2) = [1 + 1 (Ω−2)] ()0[()]()0[()]  (61)
Then, replace  ( Ω−2) in (45) to get
1 =  (1−)
Z
Φ
()0[()]
()0[()]
(|Ω−2)
1+1(Ω−2) (62)
This equation imposes a restriction on the vector {1 (Ω−2)}∈Φ. However, there are many
choices that are consistent with this equation. One particular choice is 1 ( Ω−2) = 1, in
which case we have the transfer scheme
1 =  (1−)
Z
Φ
()0[()]
()0[()]  (|Ω−2)  − 1
3 ( Ω−2) = (1 + 1)
n ()0[()]
()0[()] − 1
o

Now pick an arbitrary state −1. Once again we obtain
3 (−1Ω−2) = [1 + 1 ( −1Ω−2)]
n ()0[()]
()0[()] − 1
o
 (−1Ω−2) = [1 + 1 ( −1Ω−2)] ()0[()]()0[()] 
and the money demand equation
1 =  (1−)
Z
Φ
()0[()]
()0[()]
(|−1Ω−2)
1+1(−1Ω−2) (63)
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Again for the money demand equations (62) and (63) to hold, we must have
1 + 1 ( −1Ω−2) = (1 + 1)  (|−1Ω−2) (|Ω−2) 
which implies the inflation rate is given by
 (Ω) = (1 + 1) (|−1Ω−2)(|Ω−2) 
()0[()]
()0[()] 
and the price of money and the price of goods are stochastic and satisfy
 (Ω) = (|Ω−2)()0[()](|−1Ω−2)(1−)−1(1+1)   (Ω) =−1 (1+1)(|−1Ω−2)()(|Ω−2) 
Proof of Proposition 3. In this proof, we show that it is optimal and feasible to implement the
same allocation as for state-contingent monopoly pricing. The central bank allocation has to satisfy
the entry condition (18) and the pricing equation (29). Let ˆ (Ω) ≡  (Ω)  (Ω−1)  which is the
relative price between market 2 and market 3 goods. Since at time ,  (Ω−1) is a predetermined
variable, the central bank can aﬀect this relative price by changing  (Ω) via policy. Then rewrite
(29) as Z
Φ
 () 
h
ˆ (1−)− 0 () 
i
 (|Ω−1) = 0
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The central bank now chooses , ,  and ˆ to maximize
 =
∞X
=0

Z
Φ
© ¡¢−  ()  () ª  (|Ω−1)
−
∞X
=0

Z
Φ
 ()  (|Ω−1)
+
∞X
=0

Z
Φ

¡ − ¢  (|Ω−1)
+
∞X
=0

Z
Φ
ˆ
n
 ()−
h
ˆ −  ()
i

o
 (|Ω−1)
+
∞X
=0

Z
Φ
 () 
h
ˆ (1−)− 0 () 
i
 (|Ω−1) 
where ˆ =  ()  is the Lagrange multiplier for (18) and  is the one for (29). Since we know
 =  in equilibrium, we can eliminate  and simply choose ,  and ˆ for all . The
first-order conditions for ,  and ˆ are
0 = 0 [( () )]− 0 ()  − 
µ +
1−
¶
0 ()  (64)

h
ˆ − 
0()
1−
i
= 0 [( () )]  − 0 ()  −  ()− 0 () (1− ) (65)
0 =  ()− ˆ +  ()  (66)
If the central bank enacts a policy such that the relative price is given by
ˆ (Ω) ≡  (Ω)  (Ω−1) = 
0 [ ()] 
1−  (67)
then (64)-(66) reduce to (51)-(53). Furthermore, this choice also satisfies the pricing equation (29).
Consequently, the central bank chooses the same allocation as with state-contingent monopoly
pricing.
Implementation: The central bank wants to replicate the state-contingent monopoly pricing
allocation. All that remains to be determined is how to implement it with non-state-contingent
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pricing. Consider the case 0 ()  0. Assume that the transfers are such that the agents have
just enough money to buy  () in each state. This implies that the aggregate money stock must
purchase total nominal output in market 2; i.e., −1 [1 + 1 (Ω)] =  (Ω−1)  (). From (67) we
have
 (Ω)−1 [1 + 1 (Ω)] = (1−)−1  () 0 [ ()] . (68)
We also have  =  (Ω)−1 [1 + 1 (Ω) + 3 (Ω)]. Using (68) we get
 = (1−)−1  () 0 [ ()] + 3 (Ω) (Ω)−1 (69)
As before, assume the central bank only conditions the money growth rate on the last two shocks for
any Ω−2. Denote  (Ω) =  ( −1Ω−2). Consider the state  = ( ) and set 3 ( ) =
0. Thus from (69) we have
 = (1−)−1  () 0 [ ()] 
This pins down the real stock of money. It then follows from the buyer’s budget constraint that
1 + 1 ( Ω−2) = [1 + 1 ( Ω−2)] 
 ()
 () 
In short, with  (Ω−1) fixed, nominal spending has to rise as  () increases, meaning the nominal
injection in market 1 must also rise regardless of what happens in market 3. We can then solve for
3 ( ) as before to obtain (60). Using the expression above in (60) yields
3 ( Ω−2) = [1 + 1 ( Ω−2)]
n 0[()]
0[()] − 
()
()
o

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so
 ( Ω−2) = [1 + 1 ( Ω−2)] 
0 [ ()] 
0 [ ()]  
Using this expression and (67) in (23) we obtain
1 =  (1−)
Z
Φ
0[()]
0[()]
(|Ω−2)
1+1(Ω−2) (70)
This places a restriction on 1 ( Ω−2) given by
1 ( Ω−2) =  (1−)
Z
Φ
0[()]
0[()]  (|Ω−2)  − 1
This gives us all of the transfers for −1 = 
Now consider any state −1. We get
3 ( −1Ω−2) = [1 + 1 (−1Ω−2)]
h ()0[()]
()0[()] − 1
i
 ( −1Ω−2) = [1 + 1 (−1Ω−2)] ()0[()]()0[()] 
Then from (67) in (23) we get
1 =  (1−)
Z
Φ
()0[()]
()0[()]
(|−1Ω−2)
1+1(−1Ω−2) (71)
In order for (70) and (71) to hold we must have
[1 + 1 ( −1Ω−2)] = [1 + 1 ( Ω−2)] ()(|−1Ω−2)()(|Ω−2) 
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This pins down 1 ( −1) as a function of 1 ( ) for all −1 Thus the implementation scheme
1 ( Ω−2) =  (1−)
Z
Φ
0[()]
0[()]  (|Ω−2)  − 1
1 (−1Ω−2) = [1 + 1 ( Ω−2)] ()(|−1Ω−2)()(|Ω−2) − 1
3 (−1Ω−2) = [1 + 1 ( Ω−2)] (|−1Ω−2)(|Ω−2)
h 0[()]
0[()] − 
()
()
i

and the subsequent inflation rates
 (Ω−2) = [1 + 1 ( Ω−2)] 
0 [ ()] 
0 [ ()]  ∀
 (Ω) =  (Ω−2)  (|−1Ω−2) (|Ω−2)
allow the central bank to implement the state-contingent monopoly pricing allocation even though
there is price posting. We can then solve for the equilibrium prices
 (Ω) = ()0[()]−1[1+1(−1Ω−2)](1−) and  (Ω−1) =−1 [1+1(Ω−2)](|−1Ω−2)()(|Ω−2) 
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